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Contraception and the fertility transition
Abstract
Dominant paradigms of fertility choice either ignore or assume small, unchanging cost of fertility limitation.
Inspired by the historical English experience that is contrary to such assumptions, we modify the Beckerian
paradigm to incorporate costly, societal influence on contraception. In the model economy, heterogeneous,
generationally-linked households choose between “traditional” and “modern” contraception. The modern has
a higher fixed cost (reflecting social opprobrium) but a lower variable cost of averting childbirths. Initially, the
rich adopt the modern, and in doing so, unleash a social diffusion process. Eventually everyone switches
lowering fertility further and across society. What hastens the switch is the decline in child mortality. The
model is broadly consistent with important features of the English transition and has implications for more
recent transitions.
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Dominant paradigms of fertility choice either ignore or assume small, unchanging cost
of fertility limitation. Inspired by the historical English experience that is contrary to such
assumptions, wemodify the Beckerian paradigm to incorporate costly, societal influence on
contraception. In the model economy, heterogeneous, generationally-linked households
choose between “traditional” and “modern” contraception. The modern has a higher fixed
cost (reflecting social opprobrium) but a lower variable cost of averting childbirths. Initially,
the rich adopt the modern, and in doing so, unleash a social diffusion process. Eventually
everyone switches lowering fertility further and across society. What hastens the switch is
the decline in child mortality. The model is broadly consistent with important features of
the English transition and has implications for more recent transitions.
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1 Introduction
The Victorian period represents a major turning point in the population history of England.
Three profound and unrelenting demographic transformations originate in this period. First
came the mortality transition: life expectancy at birth rose from near 40 by 1830 to 50 by 1900.
Much of this progress touched the lives of children: a newborn during 1861-70 had a 27.9%
chance of dying before reaching age five, by 1911-20 only 16.5%. The fertility transition fol-
lowed. Marriages in 1860, when they lasted twenty years or more, produced on average 6.16
births; by 1915, that number had declined to 2.43. Accompanying these radical transitions was
the third, a somewhat overlooked revolution in family-size limitation – a contraception revo-
lution, a new paradigm of conscious prevention (via natural or artificial means) of unwanted
pregnancies subsequent to reaching parity. There is indirect evidence of such birth control:
32.9% of women born during 1840-69 had two or fewer children (live births) ever, compared to
57.5% of women born during 1870-99 (Hinde, 2003, Table 13.2). While change in nuptiality, the
proportion of women marrying, was a proximate determinant of fertility until the eighteenth
century, it had little explanatory power for the nineteenth century fertility decline. Similarly,
changes in the distribution of age at marriage were too minor to play much of a role.
We propose a theory where these demographic transformations become causally entwined:
the mortality transition triggers the contraception revolution, which in turn, makes the fertility
transition possible. In our story, one or more factors trigger a reduction in the desired fertility
of couples, be it rising adult wages that raise the opportunity cost of childbearing or declin-
ing child mortality that creates too many surviving children. All else same, whatever the par-
ity (family-size target) may be, the natural process of procreation, if unrestricted, would likely
overshoot it. This isn’t much of a concern if child mortality is high so the number of surviving
children is still close to target. But if child mortality declines precipitously, as it did in England,
couples have no choice but to adopt some method of birth control so as to stay on target. It is
this line of argument that places the contraception revolution firmly at the center of our story
and in between the mortality and the (subsequent) fertility transitions.
Placing the contraception revolution center stage does a whole lot more. Economists have
long sought to explain the emergence and persistence of the fertility transition. Their search for
a single explanation, a single trigger, has led them to doubt the role of the mortality transition
and negate the contribution of the contraception transition (Galor, 2012).1 Indeed, the domi-
1For Becker (1960), rapid industrialization and urbanization circa mid-nineteenth century generated strong
wage and incomegrowthwhich raised the opportunity time-cost of children and triggered the switch fromquantity
to quality of children. For others, the acceleration in the rate of technological progress during this period increased
the role of human capital in production and triggered households to have fewer but higher quality children (see
Galor, 2005, 2012, for an overview of this research).
2
nant (Beckerian) paradigm of fertility views the contraception revolution as a side show, amere
reflection of changes in the demand for children: in that paradigm, couples perform a simple
cost-benefit analysis to compute their fertility target and achieve it at no cost (Becker, 1960).2,3
But more importantly, the Beckerian paradigm implicitly assumes couples’ fertility decisions
are impervious to social influences of any kind. As we discuss in Section 2, such an assumption
is limiting: late nineteenth century England saw significant institutional resistance – from the
clergy and the medical profession – to the practice of marital fertility control making a couple’s
goal of attaining their fertility target costly, challenging, and subject to social opprobrium. Ad-
ditionally, there is evidence these costs abated over time as information about and access to
fertility control became available and the very notion and possibility of fertility regulation be-
came increasingly acceptable. Positioning contraception at the center of the historical fertility
transition offer us one possible way to model these social influences on fertility and to study
if their inclusion amplifies the potency of an existing trigger, be it wage growth or mortality
declines, enough to elevate its status to the explanation.
In our model, the household’s Beckerian cost-benefit analysis of fertility is expanded to in-
clude social influences on fertility as well as the cost of achieving that fertility via specific con-
traception strategies. In our setup, the biological process, left unhindered, will produce chil-
dren in conformity with “natural fertility” whatever may be the true demand for children. If
fewer children are desired, this biological process has to be restrained through contraception,
with associated costs and benefits. We show that for a given contraception strategy, an exoge-
nous decline in childmortality causes a decline in both childbirths (TFR) and surviving children
(NFR). The latter is true only when income crosses a threshold, and once that happens, families
start to make investments in the quality of their offspring. This is important for the follow-
ing reason. A key pillar of historical demographic transitions is that declines in TFR and NFR
often followed declines in child mortality. Simple versions of the Becker model, with homoth-
etic preferences, have trouble delivering this link. This has been noted by Doepke (2005) and
more recently Galor (2012). In fact Galor (2012) uses it to pass an indictment against such a
causal link. Our model is able to deliver this link since costly fertility control naturally gives rise
2Existing models within this paradigm could easily be amended to accommodate costly fertility regulation pro-
vided the cost is fixed, relatively small, and does not evolve systematically over time or across people. Qualiti-
tatively speaking, such an approach would essentially introduce a level effect on fertility relative to a standard
Beckerian model (one with zero cost), and hence, would not add much insight.
3Becker (1991) writes standard economic theories “appear sufficient to explain major declines in fertility, and
simple and sufficiently effective birth control methods have been available to produce these declines” (p.141).
We argue such a view is at odds with important ground realities of the English transitions. First, while it is true
“simple and sufficiently effective birth control methods” had been known for centuries in England and elsewhere,
information about how they worked was not widely available nor always precise. Second, that illegitimate fertility
fell in conjunction with marital fertility during England’s transition indicates the means to achieve fertility targets
changed (Knodel and van de Walle, 1986).
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to non-homothetic preferences over the number of children. It bears mention that our link is
conceptually very different from the same obtained via a precautionary-demand-for-children
channel – one that arises because of uncertainty regarding the number of child survivors – ex-
plored in Kalemli-Ozcan (2008).
In the dynamic version of our model, we allow for persistent intra- and inter-generational
income heterogeneity across households in order to capture cross-sectional differences in fer-
tility behavior before, during and after the English transition (Clark, 2005). We also permit
households to choose between two birth control strategies: a traditional method (infanticide,
some abstinence, prolonged breast-feeding) and a more efficient, modern one (coitus inter-
ruptus, later sheaths and appliances).4 Associated with each strategy are costs that, for conve-
nience, take the form of utility loss alone. We posit that while the modern strategy comes with
a higher fixed cost (social opposition, informational barriers), it has a lower variable cost (more
effective) when it comes to averting childbirths. The social diffusion of contraception adoption
is specified as a randommatching process that brings together adopters and those yet to adopt
(Munshi andMyaux, 2006). While the initial adopters of themodernmethod are the rich – those
who are not dissuaded by the associated higher fixed cost – eventually everyone switches to the
modern technology so as to economize on the variable cost. What hastens the switch is the
decline in childmortality. In addition, adoption ofmodern contraception unleashes a diffusion
process that lowers its fixed cost over time. More people switch, further lowering the TFR and
NFR. Our numerical experiments are designed to be suggestive of ways in which our story is in
line with the English fertility transition.
While childmortality triggers the English fertility transition in ourmodel, our theory ismore
general: it can include other catalysts, such as income growth. Income growth can, over time,
take the economy from aMalthusian to a post-Malthusian to a modern equilibrium. Along the
way, the cross-sectional correlation between household income and fertility goes from being
positive to negative. The lower demand for children, from the post-Malthusian phase onwards,
means a latent demand for fertility regulation which households are able to act upon when
income crosses a threshold and/or child mortality rates fall. In other words, income growth
alone can generate contraception and fertility transitions in our model.
The dynamic model incorporates income growth from exogenous productivity improve-
ment. This is done mainly to generate plausible child quality investment in the model in line
4Our decision to lump the withdrawal method with modern, appliance-based methods, may appear strange.
Data limitations, as discussed in Section 6 below, govern this decision, partly. Perhapsmore importantly, Victorian
England was characterized by a “general state of profound public ignorance onmatters of basic sexual functioning
and anatomy...even among trained doctors.” (Garrett et al., 2001) The implication is that while coitus interruptus
was known of and even practiced on occasion before 1850, it took a contraception revolution to get people to
practice it as part of a deliberate, informed choice to curb childbearing.
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with data frommid-nineteenth century. Within the confines of this limited purpose, our quanti-
tative assessment suggests that England’s steep child mortality decline was more instrumental
in its ensuing fertility transition than was income growth. A more general setup, one that al-
lows income growth to play a more significant role, could potentially alter this conclusion. Our
model, as such, should not be seen competing in quantitative horse races with income growth
or other theories of the English transition, such as the precautionary motive (Kalemli-Ozcan,
2008), the gender wage gap (Galor and Weil, 1996) and productivity change (Bar and Leukhina,
2010) to a name a few. Income or human capital growth could have acted as triggers in the En-
glish case and in other societies, at other times, particularly where it is unclear whether or not
the mortality transition preceded the fertility transition. Our quantitative work also shows that
contraception by itself could not have triggered the fertility transition. Nevertheless, it was a
vital link between England’s mortality and fertility transitions.
Beyond the relevance of our work for historical, and possibly modern, transitions (see Sec-
tion 7), this paper makes several theoretical contributions. It shows that costly contraception
in the Becker model can generate a link from child mortality to total and net fertility rates with-
out relying on subsistence constraints that may not have applied to all socio-economic groups
in nineteenth century England (Galor, 2005; Clark, 2005), or relying on uncertainty regarding
child survival as in Kalemli-Ozcan (2008). It also shows how pre-transition economies are char-
acterized by a positive cross-sectional correlation between household income and fertility, a
correlation that turns negative during the transition as wealthier households adopt costlier but
more efficient methods of contraception.
Our goal is to study how social influences on fertility decisions, social diffusion and the cost
of contraception adoption modify our understanding of the Beckerian model. The important
lesson learnt is that since the fertility transition is accompanied by rapid social change, under-
standing social influence in general and contraception choice in particular, can significantly
improve our appreciation for mortality decline as a trigger of demographic change.
Some facts about the English transition are outlined in Section 2 below. Section 3 specifies
a dynastic model where households care about the quantity and quality of children and face
costly fertility regulation. The static and dynamic equilibria are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
specifies the process of diffusion by which households switch to a more efficient contraception
technology. Section 6 parameterizes the model. Based on observed declines in child mortal-
ity and indirect evidence on fertility regulation in late nineteenth century England, numerical
simulations show that the predicted fertility transition broadly fits the time-series of the English
transition. Section 7 discusses the applicability of our model to more recent transitions.
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2 The Fertility Transition in England &Wales
In his tome, The Demographic Transition, Chesnais (1992) lays out three central propositions
that capture major demographic transitions: (i) the chronological sequence of the transition,
mortality decline, followed by fertility decline5, (ii) a general restriction of marriages followed
by a limitation of births, and (iii) the context of modernization – the overarching trends in soci-
eties evolving from traditional, agrarian to modern, urban forms – and their effect on the onset
of fertility decline. The English demographic transition, as we describe below, fits these propo-
sitions reasonably well.
2.1 The Englishmortality and fertility declines
Figure 1 illustrates the transitions inmortality and fertility. Themeasure ofmortality used in the
figure is child mortality rate (CMR), the probability of death between ages 0-5, data for which
goes back only to 1841. As the upper panel shows, CMR remained high until the 1860s, after
which it started to fall steeply.6 This was part of a broader progress in mortality that was con-
fined to those between the ages of one and forty: mortality in these age groups fell by nearly
50% in the 1890s compared to their levels in the 1830s. Immunization against small pox and
other diseases, improvements in sanitation and public health, all played significant roles in this
mortality decline. This account of English mortality is largely agreed upon by demographers
who use it to place the onset of the child mortality transition somewhere in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century.
The onset of England and Wales’ – indeed much of Europe’s, France being a major outlier –
fertility transition has been dated by demographers to somewhere in the 1870s (Figure 1) or a
bit later (Chesnais, 1992, Table 4.3). The decline in the total fertility rate that we see in the upper
panel of Figure 1 was accompanied by a decline in net fertility (lower panel). Fertility did de-
cline earlier in the nineteenth century, between 1811-20 and 1846, but then remained steady for
three decades until the 1870s when it started on its path of precipitous and consistent decline.
The principal driver of that earlier decline was nuptiality, changes in the age and incidence of
marriage.7
5Some authors have noted that France, and possibly Belgium and Germany, were exceptions to this. Chesnais
(1992) makes a persuasive case for otherwise.
6Hinde (2003, p. 195), using a different yardstick, life expectancy at birth, for which longer time series are avail-
able, argues that the English mortality transition went through three phases: there was a “definite, though rather
modest” decline during 1780-1830, followed by stagnation during the mid nineteenth century, and finally, a sec-
ond “decisive” period of decline starting in the 1860s. The expectation of life at birth was roughly 35 years in 1750
and reached 40 years by 1830 (and stayed there till the 1870s); thereafter it rose faster, reaching 60 years by 1930.
7Reviewing the literature, Hinde (2003; Ch 13) is definitive on this: “[...] very little of the massive decline in
the average completed fertility between women born in the middle of the nineteenth century and women born at
6
Consistent with Chesnais’s second proposition, the English fertility transition represented a
shift in fertility behavior from the extensivemargin (nuptiality) to the intensivemargin (fertility
regulation within marriage), a transition from ‘natural’ fertility to controlled fertility. Fertility
limitation now depended on the number of children a couple already had, reflecting a con-
scious choice and ability to restrict family size. Average completed family size of ever-married
women fell from over 7 for birth cohorts 1826-31 to about 4 for cohorts 1891-96 (Hinde, 2003).
32% of women born in 1840-69 had completed family size of fewer than three children (live
births), compared to roughly 56% of women born in 1870-99, suggesting some sort of deliber-
ate family limitation was being pursued. Reher (1999) views this period of history as a break
from the past. For the first time, faced with the reality of low child mortality, couples made
the decision to “give individual choice priority over social norms and ended up curtailing their
fertility...[The] entire context of social, economic and cultural modernization contributed to
people’s willingness to adopt new strategies when faced with new realities, but intuitively the
point of departure would seem to have been incipient mortality transformation.”
What of Chesnais’s first proposition? Chesnais makes a prima facie case mortality declines
in portions of western Europe preceded fertility declines by at least a century, the implication
being the mortality decline had little to do with the fertility decline. However, after account-
ing for data limitations, wide variability in declines, and exceptions such as France, Chesnais
comes to the tempered conclusion that declines in mortality “seem to be necessary” for the
fertility transition but “hardly sufficient” (p. 149). Reher (2009) is far more sanguine: “Nearly
everywhere mortality decline preceded fertility decline. Child mortality was the first to decline,
followed somewhat later by declines in infant mortality”.
For our purpose, it is of some importance that the mortality decline preceded and hence,
could have instigated, the subsequent fertility decline. The exact length of the delay is of sec-
ondary concern. Our theory below can also generate a fertility transition from income growth
alone. Clark (2005) ponders a similar question. He argues that higher social class and gross fer-
tility were negatively associated in late nineteenth century England. Using wills, testators and
survivors data, he find a positive association between income and net fertility in pre-transition
England and concludes that “this positive association between fertility and income [in pre-
industrial England] seemingly becomes negative in the period of the demographic transition”.
the end of that century can be attributed to changes in nuptiality”. This suggests the extensive margin of fertility
was not that important which, in turn, justifies the singular focus of this paper on the internal margin. A new
and contrarian twist to this issue comes from Garrett et al. (2001): “choosing to marry later may have been as
conscious an act as choosing to use a particular method of contraception.” And in their view, this explains France
and England’s “different paths to low fertility” because “postponement of marriage was a ‘conscious choice’ by
individual English couples and thus equivalent to the fertility regulation being practised by their cross-channel
neighbours.”
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2.2 The Costs of Contraception
Knowledge about birth control goes back to several centuries. Hippocratic texts of the late fifth
and fourth century BCE contain details about controlling the biology of procreation and, even
earlier, the withdrawal method was discussed as a means to avoid conception (McLaren 1991,
Kohler, 2001). Despite this, centuries-old knowledge of some methods of contraception was
never widely diffused, nor were such forms of contraception widely practiced. Sources often
presented medically reliable techniques right next to magical recipes, sowing more confusion
than informing. Moreover, while the birth control movement of nineteenth century drew on
this centuries-old knowledge, its immediate source were Islamic texts, indicating the lack of
accessible European sources (Peel, 1964).
Books extolling the virtues and rational methods of birth control started appearing in Eng-
land in the early nineteenth century. For a while these had little impact on fertility behavior
or public opinion. In his book The Fruits of Philosophy published in 1832 in Massachusetts,
Charles Knowlton discussed the effectiveness of douching as a new method of birth control
and informed readers about the physiology of conception and treatments for fertility and im-
potence. It too had little immediate impact. It was only in 1876, when the English fertility tran-
sition was just unfolding and the book was republished in England that it became enormously
controversial and popular. The publishers Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh were indicted
on grounds of publishing “lewd, filthy, bawdy and obscene” material and sentenced to impris-
onment, later overturned on appeal. The attention garnered by the case raised awareness and
sales of the book shot up from a few hundred to thousands per year. More publications on birth
control followed in the subsequent decades, many promoting relatively easy to use, at-home,
methods (Hinde, 2003). Not all such literature was reliable. Many pseudo-scientific handbills
and pamphletswere fromquacks. McLaren (1991) concludes that “the circulation of the quacks’
literature was in addition (to the expansion in publishing facilities) an indication of the public’s
continuing desire for some type of instruction on procreation” (p. 80).
There is evidence that in most regions of England, marital fertility was lowered through
“stopping” behavior. This was primarily achieved through more frequent usage of abstention
and the withdrawal method. The latter was particularly responsible for the sharp reductions
in working class fertility achieved during 1880-1910 (McLaren, 1991). Contraceptive devices,
on the other hand, were not widely used initially. Condoms and spermicides were not widely
available and too expensive until the twentieth century.8 Secondly, ignorance and unreliable
promises made by the penny press made people more skeptical of these devices. Many women
8Considerable advancements in reproductive technology happened at the start of the twentieth century. By the
1920s, caps and diaphragms started to become widely available in birth control clinics. Then came spermicidal
pessaries, sheaths, and finally, by early 1930s, the latex condom (Fisher and Szreter, 2003).
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perceived them to be physically harmful, a perception aggravated bymedical advice. Condoms,
on the other hand, were associated in the popular mind with prostitution and the prevention of
STDs (Seccombe, 1990).
A major hurdle to the democratization of birth control in English society was the deep-
seated resistance from the medical profession and, less surprisingly, religious authorities. A
former primeminister’s public advocacy of doctors providing guidance on family limitationwas
widely condemned by the medical press. The medical community labeled family limitation as
folk medicine practiced by quacks and midwives. Others went further. Dr Charles H. F. Routh,
an influential gynecologist at the Samaritan Hospital for Women and Children, railed against
contraception as “a great moral crime” and blamed it for a long list of serious physiological
harm and psychological problems including mental decay, cardiac problems, metritis, cancer,
sterility and suicidal tendencies. As late as 1901, an editorial in the British Medical Journal la-
belled it as “unnatural and degrading...and oft injurious to both husband and wife” (Soloway,
1982).
Requests for information about contraceptives were regularly rebuffed by public health pro-
fessionals including nurses and pharmacists and, aggravating matters, physicians failed “to
make a distinction between abortifacients and contraceptives” (Seccombe, 1992). Indeedmany
doctors felt it was their duty to prevent the spread of contraceptive knowledge and devices. Cor-
respondents inMarie Stopes’Mother Englandmention that doctors had refused to inform them
about contraceptive devices, even as they warned patients of the dangers of further pregnan-
cies (Secombe, 1992). McLaren (1991) cites the writing of one doctor: “It was not the doctor’s
duty to instruct laymen on the details of procreation for such information might be then used
to escape the punishment ordained by God for sexual misdemeanours” (p. 80).
Religious authorities, both Protestant (Anglican) and Catholic, reinforced this opposition
to any form of contraception until 1930 when the Anglican Church first adopted a more ac-
commodating stance (Szreter, 1996).9 Religious doctrines of the times proscribed couples from
“engaging in any act which would hinder the natural power of procreating life” and rejected
appliance-based methods on the grounds they tampered with “nature or God’s will” (Fisher,
2006). In many cases, the clergy simply ignored or avoided the topic: “they don’t talk about it in
church...[yet] everybody that goes to church knows...you’re not supposed to use contraceptives”
(Fisher, 2006, p. 152).
In an era of insufficient information and weak understanding of the biology of procreation,
it is not hard to imagine that medical, religious and political resistance to the idea of birth con-
9Garrett et. al (2001) describe it succintly as follows: “Such evidence as is available indicates a generally negative
and moralistic attitude towards contraceptives, something that was endorsed as much by a medical profession
anxious to avoid slurs on its reputation, as by the Anglican clergy and by working-class leaders.”
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trol would have raised the social cost of practicing family limitation in late nineteenth cen-
tury England. They would have been privately costly as well. Certain methods like the rhythm
methodwere unavailable as the precise timing of ovulationwas not known. Forworking classes,
contraceptives were expensive items. Female contraceptive devices were especially so, requir-
ing clinical help and being subject to the risk of infection in the absence of indoor plumbing.
Andmethods such as withdrawal and abstinence that had been practiced only sporadically ear-
lier, would have been psychologically costly because of their perceived health andmoral failings
(Seccombe, 1990).
It is in order to discuss a contrarian view of all this due to Garrett et al. (2001).10 Their
argument relies on two planks: a) that there was no “emergence of novel ideas or attitudes
concerning family size....[no] dramatic social change or cultural innovation in the widespread
use of appliance methods of birth control”, and b) “available...survey evidence all indicates
that ‘traditional’, non-appliance techniques of birth control, involving attempted abstinence,
coitus interruptus and abortion, were the main methods of birth control.” In our view, one
shared by decades of demography research including the European Fertility Project’s, is that
what emerged was the very idea that fertility was indeed controllable which meant, for the first
time, ‘conscious choice’ could be applied to fertility. At the same time as this new notion is sur-
facing, the demand for some kind of fertility control is starting to rise as mortality starts to fall
appreciably and incomes continue to rise. This urgency for birth control stokes the need to get
more information on the process of procreation leading to a renewed attention on coitus inter-
ruptus. All this was impossible to ignore because the issues were getting discussed publicly, in
meetings, newspapers, pamphlets. The outrage, we describe above, ensued precisely because
a social change was perceived to be underway: it was a reaction to this change. It implies the
social change was considered unacceptable possibly because it was new, not “traditional”.
2.3 Diffusion
The English fertility decline broadly followed socio-economic lines with the fertility differential
across social and occupational categories widening in the early days of the transition. The de-
cline started among the upper and middle classes where women marrying in the 1880s were
having 3.8 children compared to 6.3 for those who had married in the 1860s (Woods, 2000, Ta-
10“The year 1876 should not, we would thus argue, be taken as a chronological marker either of the emergence
of novel ideas or attitudes concerning family size, or of the advent of newmethods of birth control. Indeed, Szreter
has seriously questioned the extent to which there is any plausible evidence that there was any dramatic social
change or cultural innovation in the widespread use of appliance methods of birth control before the inter-war
decades of the next century. He has pointed out that careful scrutiny of the available quantitative, qualitative
and survey evidence all indicates that ‘traditional’, non-appliance techniques of birth control, involving attempted
abstinence, coitus interruptus and abortion, were the main methods of birth control used before the Great War.”
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ble 4.1, age at marriage 20-24). Even though fertility fell in successive marriage cohorts for all
socio-economic groups, the faster decline among urban propertied classes opened up a fertil-
ity differential. By the late nineteenth century, working-class fertility started falling noticeably,
first among Yorkshire and Lancashire’s textile workers many of whom were married women,
then among other working-classes well into the twentieth century (Seccombe, 1990; Haines,
1992).
Many demographers see this pattern of differential fertility transition as indicative of so-
cial diffusion, as “the new reproductive habits began to spread (from the upper- and middle-
classes) amongst the less privileged social groups” (Woods, 2000, p. 114, quoting from the work
of J. A. Banks). This view of social diffusion was reinforced by the European Fertility Project’s
findings that fertility decline often followed religious and linguistic lines across economically
disparate regions of the continent. Szreter’s (1992) reinterpretation of the English data mod-
ifies Banks’ hypothesis. The process of diffusion and absorption of new reproductive norms,
Szreter argues, could not have been as simple as copying the family limitation practices of the
upper- and middle-classes by lower socio-economic groups. If this were the dominant process
of diffusion, one would have expected female domestic servants hired in upper- and middle-
class families to have been major agents of change. The evidence, however, suggests women
in domestic service were socially isolated and least likely to acquire knowledge of sexual mat-
ters. Instead, any diffusion of behavior would have worked through job expectations: “as the
servant-employing class itself found it increasingly necessary to restrict its own family size...it
may well have adjusted downwards, either consciously or not, its tolerance for large families
among its resident servants” (Szreter, 1992, p. 479).11
Family limitation behavior of the upper- and middle-classes may have, however, indirectly
affected the behavior of other classes. As we pointed out earlier, social activism and the ar-
rival of new literature on birth control increasingly placed family limitation in the popular con-
sciousness. That a couple could choose to restrict family size, an idea that would have alien just
a few decades earlier, gained popularity and feasible by the late nineteenth century. Diffusion,
in this case, took the form of social influence.
Where social learning, the diffusion of knowledge about birth control, played a role was
within some socio-economic groups. In her reviewofMarie Stopes’ correspondencewithworking-
class women soliciting birth control information, Seccombe (1990, 1992) offers convincing ev-
idence of this. Working-class women acquired knowledge of contraceptives through word of
mouth. The main hurdles were not so much a stigma against discussing these as ignorance
about contraception and a taboo against the use of artificial means to restrict fertility within
11This motivates our formalization of contraception adoption as an arms-length process of diffusion from early
to late adopters.
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marriage. Many of Stopes’ correspondents were fearful of the side effects of contraception in
general and “preventatives” in particular while others were unsure where to find contraceptives
since they were not yet sold over the counter in local shops.
3 TheModel
Demographers classify theories of the fertility transition in two categories, “innovation-based”
and “adjustment-based”(see Hinde, 2003, Ch. 13). In the former view, for example in the find-
ings of the European Fertility Project, a sharp distinction is drawn between pre-transition com-
munities where most people found the very idea of family limitation inconceivable and subse-
quent post-transition communities where the question, “howmany children should we have?”
was routinely asked and answered (Woods, 2000, p. 169). In this view, the transition is pre-
cipitated by a social innovation, the widespread recognition of the notion that family limita-
tion does lie in the realm of conscious action. Proponents of this view argue fertility behavior
changed as a consequence of this social innovation and, in turn, fostered increased adoption of
contraception over time and space.
Adjustment-based theories, on the other hand, highlight how socio-economic changes such
as increased urbanization and industrialization lowered the demand for children and, in re-
sponse, families welcomed birth control into their fertility calculus. Adjustment-based theories
– what economists call the demand-side view – assume, however, a household’s fertility objec-
tive is achieved at little or no cost. They also assume family limitation was always part of the
realm of conscious action: if prevailing socio-economic conditions justified high fertility, fam-
ily limitation, even when available, would not have been adopted. The evidence from Victo-
rian England we have presented in Section 2.2 suggests that actively regulating marital fertility
would have been financially and psychologically costly in the face of social opposition, scarce
information and non-availability of reliable external devices.12 Hence, in our view, any plau-
sible account of the historical fertility transition needs to recognize these restrictions (see the
conclusion for a discussion of how this relates to modern fertility transitions).
The theory we propose is an amalgam of the innovation and adjustment hypotheses. Dif-
fusion of the notion of fertility control alone cannot explain the onset of the English transition.
That fertility started falling across all socio-economic groups from the 1870s – groups with very
different birth-control adoption rates – suggests an underlying common cause that necessitated
a need for smaller families. In our model, declining child mortality across all income groups is
12It is important to recognize that evidence of a contraception revolution does not imply a contraceptive revolu-
tion. Indeed contraceptives – external devices andmedications – were not widely used duringmuch of the English
transition.
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that common cause, one which lowers the demand for children and motivates the need for an
adjustment in fertility objectives. Initially-available birth control methods are not as effective
in achieving those objectives and adoption of more effective methods involves hefty switching
costs. Richer households are the first to respond: they reduce family size by switching to more
efficient forms of birth control, despite the high cost. These costs fall over time as information
about modern methods becomes widely available and social opposition to their use in marital
fertility regulation abates. As child mortality and fertility limitation costs keep falling, effective
fertility control becomes a no-brainer for more and more households. The fertility transition,
ultimately, sweeps through all rungs of the socio-economic ladder as economy-wide fertility
reaches near-replacement levels.
We start by developing the basic model for a given birth control technology, with social dif-
fusion shut down (until we reach Section 5). The starting point of our model is the eve of the
fertility transition. In the model economy, the social innovation discussed above has already
happened, that is, family limitation is firmly in the fertility consciousness of agents and tra-
ditional forms of birth control have been adopted. Child mortality, the common-cause, the
adjustment, is about to sharply decline.
3.1 Basics
Consider a single-good economy consisting of an infinite sequence of three period-lived over-
lapping generations of agents. The three stages of life are childhood, adulthood and old age. At
each date t = 1,2, ..,1, a continuum of agents (children) with mass nt is born to existing adults.
An exogenous fraction, ¡t , of them survive to adulthood.
13 In childhood, agents are passive;
they simply acquire human capital, which is paid for by their parents. As young adults, they be-
come active decision-makers: they work, determine their family size and strategies to achieve
that, spend time and resources raising children, invest in their schooling, consume, and save
for old age. Everyone retires in old age and consumes all wealth before dying.
Adults are endowedwith one unit of timewhich they allocate betweenwork and raising chil-
dren. Adults differ in their labor productivity. Specifically, they are heterogeneous on a single
innate, unobserved dimension which, for convenience, we call ability. Ability " is drawn identi-
cally and independently across adults (and across generations) from a cumulative distribution
G [", "¯] with positive support ("¯ > " > 0) and an unconditional mean of unity. An adult’s ability
draw is realized upon joining the labor market. If a child’s parent invests xt°1 units of goods in
her education, similar to Moav (2005), her human capital as an adult (at the beginning of t ), qt ,
13Henceforth,¡will be dubbed the child survival rate and 1°¡ the childmortality rate. We implicitly assume¡ is
revealed early in childhood, before parental investments are made. Anyone who survives to adulthood is assumed
to survive till the end of old age.
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is given by
qt =Q(xt°1)¥ a(1+xt°1)æ, a > 0, æ 2 (0,1). (1)
This human capital, combined with her ability, produces labormarket income. For a child born
at t ° 1 whose ability "i is realized as an adult at t , “full income” in period t is given by vi t ¥
"i qtwt , where wt is the competitive wage rate per efficiency unit of labor.
The combined savings of adult-workers gets converted into the future aggregate capital
stock, K , which depreciates fully upon use and earns a return Ωt+1 between t and t + 1. The





t , At > 0, µ 2 (0,1) where At =
°
1+ g ¢At°1 and g ∏ 0 is the fixed rate of exogenous TFP
growth. If g > 0, TFP grows over time causingw to grow, which in turn, causes vi t to trend. Until
further notice we set g = 0 and At = A 8t .
3.2 Contraception technology
As noted before, demand-side models in the Beckerian tradition assume households’ desired
fertility can be costlessly implemented and without regard to social influences. Departing from
this tradition, wemodel family limitation as a conscious albeit costly attempt to control fertility
(Michael and Willis, 1976; Easterlin, 1975), one susceptible to social pulls. In our setup, the
household’s Beckerian trade-offs are adjusted further to respect the cost of achieving its fertility
target. Our formulation is related to Easterlin (1975) and Easterlin et al.’s (1980) “synthesis”
model of fertility wherein a household faces costly fertility regulation and a child production
function (“supply” of births). Unlike us, Easterlin treats the availability and use of contraception
methods as exogenous, and does not consider the transition from ‘natural’ to controlled fertility
as arising from the mortality decline and ensuing social change.
The details are as follows. Left unfettered, the biological process of procreation is assumed
to produce ¥ children in any household. Here ¥ corresponds to natural fecundity which de-
pends on biological factors and possibly social factors such as nuptiality and age at marriage.
This is taken to be exogenous as our focus is on the intensive margin of fertility regulation. If
a household wishes to attain a fertility level lower than ¥, the biological process has to be sub-
jected to active birth control through the adoption of a contraception strategy.14
We distinguish between two contraception strategies: a readily-available, traditional strat-
14Strulik (2014) takes an alternative approach by assuming households care specifically about sexual intercourse
besides the number of surviving children. In his model contraceptives are used after income crosses a threshold.
As we discussed earlier, since contraceptives were not widely used in eighteenth and early nineteenth century
England, a more general model of birth control and its associated social cost is needed to understand the English
transition.
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egy and amore efficient,modern one. It is convenient to think of the latter as “appliance-based”,
caps, condoms, diaphragms, pessaries and the like. But recall from above that the English tran-
sition initially relied on methods such as withdrawal that had been known for much longer.
What was different was a new attitude towards fertility regulation. Even though the withdrawal
method is easy to comprehend with our modern attitudes, in a society where it had been prac-
ticed sparingly, the biology of procreation ill understood, and physicians routinely blurred the
distinction between abortion and contraception, it is not hard to imagine that it would have
been significantly costly to adopt. As such we club together this newly adopted withdrawal
method with newly available appliance-based methods and label them modern. The tradi-
tional method of birth control should then be interpreted as interventions such as longer du-
ration breast-feeding, occasional abstinence (particularly by the rich who could afford sepa-
rate bedrooms for the spouses) and possibly age at marriage. Associated with each strategy
are costs that, for convenience, take the form of utility loss alone.15 While some strategies are
costly in terms of diminished sexual satisfaction or lack of spontaneity, others bring about real
or imagined decreases in physical health, require sacrifice of religious principles, or involve an
embarrassing search for reliable information about their implementation and availability.
Let j 2 {1,2} denote contraception strategies where the first strategy (technology) is identi-
fied with the traditional method, the second with the modern method. Let Æ j ∏ 0 be a fixed
cost while e j denotes how faithfully the adult household employs strategy j . The utility cost of
adopting contraceptive strategy j 2 {1,2} is ° j ¥ °(e j ) = Æ j + e2j where the second term repre-
sents a convex ‘variable cost’. Higher values of e enable the household tomore effectively attain




depends on social influence. For now, it is enough to note that Æ2 >Æ1 in a society on the cusp
of fertility regulation.
Contraception strategy j is associated with the child production function
h j (e)¥ ¥
0B@1° eq
∏ j
1CA , 0∑ e ∑q∏ j ,
where we have dropped the subscript on e. If contraception is not practiced by the household,
no births are prevented and ¥ children are necessarily born: h j (0) = ¥. Since @h j (e)/@e < 0,
more intensive implementation of j via higher e lowers the number of children relative to ¥.
Also note that @h j (e)/@e, the marginal efficiency of contraception method j , depends on ∏ j . A
higher value of ∏ j , ceteris paribus, makes technology j less effective at averting births. Hence-
15The Lewis-Faning survey found only 1.4% of the non-appliance method users referred to the monetary cost of
appliance methods as being the chief deterrent to their use. (Fisher, 2006; p. 143)
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forth, we refer to ∏ as the ineffectiveness of a contraception strategy and assume ∏1 > ∏2. For
a given e, more births are averted with technology 2 (the modern one) than with technology 1
(the traditional one) as illustrated in Figure 2a.
After invertingh(e j ) and substituting into° j , rewrite the utility cost of contraceptionmethod
j as





, Æ j ∏ 0, 0∑ n < ¥ (2)
a decreasing and convex function of childbirth. For a given technology, as the need for lower n











; 0∑∏2 <∏1; Æ1 <Æ2
implying technology 2 is more effective (has lower variable cost) at averting births than tech-
nology 1 but comes with a higher initial fixed cost. For example, in Figure 2b, °2 (n) and °1 (n)
are shown to cross; the former is higher at ¥ and the latter is higher at some n0. These differ-
ences underlie some of the results we obtain later. While the initial adopters of the modern,
appliance-based technology are the rich – those who are not fazed by the associated higher
fixed cost, Æ2 – eventually everyone switches to the modern technology so as to economize on
the variable cost.
With a slight abuse of notation, henceforth, the utility cost of restricting fertility using con-
traception strategy j will be denoted ° j (n), an increasing and convex function of the number of
births avoided through contraception.
3.3 Preferences
Adult households view children as consumption goods and derive direct utility from the num-
ber of surviving children, ¡tnt . Following Galor and Weil (2000), Greenwood and Seshadri
(2002), de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and many others, parents are assumed to be imperfectly
altruistic, receiving a warm-glow from the average human capital (earning potential),¡tnt qt+1,
of their surviving children. Parentsmake their investment subsequent to child survival and care
only about the expected human capital of the child, that is, they ignore uncertainty with respect
to child ability. In addition, they care about their own consumption in adulthood and old-age,
denoted by c1t and c2t+1 respectively. An adult agent-household i at date t employing contra-
ceptive method j derives utility V ji t where
















°º° j (nit ) (3)
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where u, y and H are strictly increasing and strictly concave functions. We take these functions
to be logarithmic and reformulate (3) to
V ji t ¥ lnci1t +Ø lnci2t+1+∞µ ln(¡tnit )+∞(1°µ) lnqit+1°º° j (nit ) (4)
where Ø> 0, ∞ 2 (0,1), µ 2 (0,1) and º 2 {0,1} is an indicator function. When º= 0, only the well-
known Beckerian calculus is operative and achieving desired fertility is costless. When º = 1,
the household’s fertility is the outcome of a birth-control technology. It can, with certainty,
have any number
°
n < ¥¢ of children it desires but now, besides the Beckerian quantity-quality
concerns, it must take into account the cost of achieving its desired fertility.16
Three points bear emphasis here. First, one must not think of the Beckerian calculus as,
in some sense, preceding the contraception calculus. In the model, the contraception calculus
is omnipresent; households do not face a choice between adoption and non-adoption of con-
traception. In Section 5 below, they will entertain the possibility of switching from traditional
forms of birth control to modern ones. Second, rejecting the contraception calculus unfailingly
implies n = ¥. Of course it is possible that families choose n = ¥, in effect behaving “as if” they
had not adopted contraception. We rule this out via Assumption 1(d) below. Third, our formu-
lation of contraception costs ostensibly appears similar to a quadratic norm over fertility, that
is the cost of deviating one’s fertility choice from the social norm, captured by some average n¯,
is (n° n¯)2. But typically such formulations rely on births not survivors. For us the relevant de-
viation is ¥°n, births averted from a state of natural fertility. An earlier work, Bhattacharya and
Chakraborty (2012), implies that in order for social norms and child mortality to matter for net
fertility, it is not sufficient to have non-homothetic preferences, social norms have to be defined
with respect to childbirths instead of surviving children. The present paper may be viewed as
building on that idea but differs fundamentally in that social influencematters only for the cost
of modern contraception, not family size norm.
3.4 The household’s problem
For now abstract from ability heterogeneity and the choice between alternative contraception
strategies and, as such, suppress the i and j superscripts. Assume everyone has already adopted
the natural method of contraception. Each adult household allocates its time endowment be-
tweenmarket activity –which brings in income vt for each unit of labor time – and child rearing.
Each surviving child requires parental nurture and care of ø 2 (0,1) units of time, ±> 0 units of
goods, and possibly an additional x units of goods of the parents’ choosing in schooling invest-
16In this setup, with continuous fertility, birth control implies stopping not spacing behavior: households use
birth control to stop future births once desired family size is reached, not to space births better.
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ment. Time-cost and goods-cost of child rearing are distinct and not equivalent. Let st denote
saving and Rt+1 be the gross one-period return on period-t saving. A typical adult-household,
taking vt as pre-determined and ¡t and Rt+1 as parametric, solves the following program at
date t :
max
{st ,nt ,xt }
Vt ¥ lnc1t +Ø lnc2t+1+∞µ ln(¡tnt )+∞(1°µ) lnqt+1°º°(nt ) (5)
subject to the budget constraints
c1t + st = (1°ø¡tnt )vt °±¡tnt °¡tnt xt , (6)
c2t+1 = Rt+1st , (7)
equations (1) and (2) and the additional constraints
c1t ∏ 0, c2t+1 ∏ 0, st ∏ 0, ¥∏ nt ∏ 0, xt ∏ 0.
Note that costs of child rearing and direct utility from children depend on the number of sur-
viving children, hence on ¡. In contrast, the cost of contraception is independent of ¡ since it
depends on the number of childbirths.
Logarithmic preferences imply that non-negativity constraints for consumption (hence, sav-
ing) and fertility will not bind in equilibrium. The household may, however, choose to have ¥
children (n = ¥) or not invest in child quality (x = 0). Denoting the Langrangemultipliers associ-
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(1°ø¡tnt )vt °±¡tnt °¡tnt xt ° st
, &x ∏ 0, &xxt = 0 (10)
for st , nt and xt respectively. We introduce a few parameter restrictions.
Assumption 1 For all t ∏ 1, assume that
(a) vt > (1°±)/ø¥ vmin













Part (a) ensures that income is high enough to afford children. Below we show it also guar-
antees a tradeoff between c1t and nt . Since the budget constraint can turn non-convex in the
presence of both child quality and quantity, part (b) is sufficient to ensure second order con-
ditions hold (see appendix A for details). Such a parameter restriction is, by now, standard in
quantity-quality models of fertility (for example, Jones et al, 2008). Part (d) implies the child
survival rate corresponding to natural fecundity
°
n = ¥¢ is ¡min. By restricting ¡t 2 °¡min,1§, we
ensure n stays below ¥.17 The importance of part (c) is clarified later.
3.5 Some Intuition
Given the somewhat non-standard household preference, it is useful to build up some intuition
on how its works. Our focus is solely on two items, the income-expansion path and the con-






z ¥¡n¢. For convenience,
we drop the t , i and j subscripts here. Also, for the present, we ignore the saving decision. Start
with V ¥ u (c)+H(z), where u and H are strictly concave, with the corresponding budget con-
straint c = (1°øz)v°±z. This is a very basic setupwith no contraception andnoquality-quantity
trade-off – in short, a Malthusian, no-contraception regime (Galor, 2012, Section 3).
As in all models of fertility choice, the price of children pz ¥ ±+ øv is income-dependent
as children require both sacrifice of consumption goods and foregone labor income. Recall
that homothetic tastes can be represented by any utility function that has the mathematical
property of being homogeneous; also, for homothetic preferences, the ratio of demands for the
two goods is independent of income. Suppose, for example, u and H are each of the CES form,
i.e., u (d) = H (d) = d1°!/(1°!). Then optimality implies that z/c = (±+øv)°1/! – the relative
demand for children is monotonically falling in household full income as children are relatively
more expensive for richer households.
More generally, household optimality requires that u0 (c(z)) (øv +±) = H 0(z). Notice that ¡
is not an independent argument anywhere in this equation and, hence, any z that solves this
equation is independent of ¡. In other words, an increase in ¡ raises the marginal cost and
lowers the marginal benefit of surviving children proportionately. It follows ¡(@n/@¡)+n = 0
so the number of childbirths, n, is proportionately declining in ¡. A natural question would
be, is the independence of z from ¡ a consequence of the assumed homogeneity of u and H?
The answer is no. To break the homogeneity suppose that u (d) = d1°!1/(1°!1) and H (d) =
d1°!2/(1°!2). It is easy to check, even here, the optimal z is independent of ¡.
Galor (2012) argues a necessary condition for declines in mortality to lower surviving fer-
tility is a stochastic z. Faced with uncertain child survival, parents may hold a “buffer stock”
17For interior x, it follows from (10) that ∞æ(1° µ)c1t = ¡nt (1+ xt ) implying n = 0, the other corner, is not a
possible optimum.
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of children. We take an alternative route by adding a convex cost to achieving target fertil-
ity through contraception, ° (n). Suppose V ¥ u (c)+H(z)°° (n). The first order condition
is ¡H 0(z)°°0 (n) = ¡ (±+øv)u0(c(z)) where the marginal benefit of increasing fertility is now
higher because it requires households to less faithfully follow contraception. More importantly,
¡ is now an independent argument in this equation. While parents care only about the number
of surviving children, the cost of having them is incurred over the number of childbirths.
Finally, note that the quadratic form for ° (n) renders the lifetime utility function (5) non-
homogenous and non-homothetic. The presence of ° (n) breaks the homogeneity of V even
though the homogeneity of u and H are retained. This will play a role in shaping the income-
expansion path, helping generate the non-monotonicity discussed in Section 5 below.
4 Fertility Regimes
For the household’s decision problem specified above, we first characterize properties of the
fertility equilibrium at any given date t where xt > 0, then proceed to analyze settings in which
parents do not invest in child quality. A regimewith xt > 0 is labeledModern, while that without
child quality investment (xt = 0) is termedMalthusian.18
4.1 Modern regime
Such a regime is characterized by xt > 0 and nt < ¥. It applies to a point in time at which the
fertility transition is already under way, people are actively limiting births and investing in the
quality of their surviving children. Setting º = 1 and &n = 0 = &x in the first order conditions
(9)–(10), and after some rearrangement, we arrive at an equation that implicitly solves for the
household’s fertility choice,








vt ° (øvt +±°1)¡nt
∏
¥≠(nt ), (11)
where√ is as defined in Assumption 1(d), and the time-subscript on¡ has been dropped for the
present. Parameter restrictions in Assumption 1 ensure an unique solution to (11) at a positive
value of nt .19 At a first glance, the effects of child mortality and contraception effectiveness be-
18We call it so because, in the absence of child quality investment, child quantity is the sole focus of the house-
hold’s fertility calculus. In Section 6, we introduce exogenous TFP growth, g . In that setting, whatwe term “Malthu-
sian” corresponds more to the “post-Malthusian Regime” in Galor (2012).
19Briefly, Assumptions 1(a) and (d) ensure that the right hand side of this equation is positive. The left hand side
¢(nt ) is decreasing in nt under Assumption 1(b) and the capacity constraint, while the right hand side ≠(nt ) is
increasing in nt under Assumption 1(a) and (d). Moreover limn!0¢(n) =1 while ≠(0) > 0. The interior fertility
choice is given by the unique intersection point.
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come apparent: if either ¡!¡min or ∏!1, then n! ¥. In other words, faced with either very
low child survival probabilities or grossly ineffective methods of contraception, households be-
have as if fertility regulation is outside their control. In such regimes, fertility is left to nature.
How does child survival affect the household’s fertility behavior more generally? Under As-
sumption 1, when ¡ rises, ¢(nt ) is unaffected while ≠(nt ) rises. Hence @n/@¡ < 0 at an inte-
rior optimum and household fertility necessarily falls with ¡. This echoes the standard result
in Beckerian models, for instance, Proposition 1 in Doepke (2005). The more relevant metric
for population movement, however, is the number of surviving children. Define the latter as
zt ¥¡nt and rewrite (11) as








vt ° (øvt +±°1)zt
∏
¥ ≠ˆ(zt ) (12)
where ¥ˆ¥¡¥. Clearly only ¢ˆ(z) depends on¡. Since ¢ˆ(z) is decreasing in z, @z/@¡< 0whenever
@¢ˆ/@¡< 0. The latter requires n to be lower than ¥/2 which obtains for income levels satisfying
vt > (1°±)¡¥(2√+')
ø¡¥(2√+')°2' ¥ v˜(¡) (13)
where ' ¥ 2∞[µ°æ(1°µ)]+∏/2. The threshold, v˜(¡), is decreasing in ¡. Thus, an increase in
¡ makes it more likely that z falls with ¡: households previously at full-income v˜ would now
find themselves above it. Since we have established that @n/@¡< 0 at an interior optimum, this
means at low income levels (vt < v˜) fertility falls less than proportionately when more children
survive.20 Proposition 1 summarizes this discussion and identifies several additional shifters of
household fertility.
Proposition 1 In a Modern Regime – one with quality investment in children – household fertil-
ity, n, is decreasing in full income (v), child rearing costs (ø,±) and the child survival rate (¡), but





on the number of surviving children (z) depends on household full income: z rises
with ¡ for v < v˜(¡) and falls for v > v˜(¡)where v˜(¡) is defined in (13).
To see the effect of full income, note only ≠(nt ) depends on vt and positively: since ≠ is
upward sloping, an increase in full income lowers the fertility choice. Similarly only ¢(nt ) in
equation (11) depends on ∏ and positively. As one would expect, less efficient methods lead to
higher number of childbirths. Similar reasoning shows household fertility falls with ± and ø.
Next, turn to the consumption-fertility tradeoff. From (7) and (8), it follows st = Øc1t which
converts (6) into (1+Ø)c1t = vt (1°ø¡nt )°±¡nt °¡nt xt . For interior x, using (10) in the last
20 v˜ also depends on ∏ (via '); indeed, v˜ is increasing in ∏ implying, given a ¡, the threshold v˜ falls as better
methods of contraception get adopted, making it easier for households to cross it.
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equation, it is easy to check that √c1t = vt ° (øvt +±°1)¡nt where √ ¥ [1+Ø+∞æ(1°µ)]. As-
sumption 1(a) guarantees a tradeoff between c1t and ¡nt ; we’ll have more to say on this below.
Finally, the child quantity-quality tradeoff. Given the optimum level of fertility from equa-










Clearly investment in child quality and surviving fertility move in opposite directions. In con-
junction with Proposition 1, this implies reductions in child mortality lead to an increase in
parental investment in child quality and richer parents investmore in their children thanpoorer
parents. Also, note from Proposition 1 that z falls when ∏ falls whichmeans x rises when ∏ falls.
Investment in child quality rises when parents use more efficient methods of contraception
since they are able to regulate fertility at lower cost. Ceteris paribus, the heightened focus on
child quality becomes more of a rational imperative with either declines in child mortality or
improvements in the contraception technology.
It is instructive to remind ourselves of the standard Beckerian calculus and present a quick
contrast with features of the Modern Regime discussed here. Set º = 0 in (11) and solve for a













/@v < 0 implying both n and z fall with v if ± < 1 (Assumption 1(c)). Using
the just-derived expression for ¡tnt and (10), we derive
x = [æø (1°µ)v + (æ± (1°µ)°µ)]/(µ°æ(1°µ))
implying that x is independent of ¡. It is also easy to check that @x/@v > 0. The implication
is that as incomes rise, investment in child quality rises and fertility falls, the usual Beckerian
quality-quantity trade-off. This means transition out of the Malthusian equilibrium in the con-
ventional Beckermodel is independent of child survival and is purely driven by income growth.
To summarize, in the Modern Regime, households, having adopted deliberate fertility con-
trol, respond to a secular increase in child survival by reducing their fertility. However, only one
group – households with income higher than a threshold v˜ – see a decline in the number of
surviving children and only these families make investments in the quality of their offspring.
The threshold itself falls with¡making it more likely for families to join this group over time. In
short, inside a modern equilibrium, a persistent decline in child mortality can, in and of itself,
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incentivize more andmore families to have fewer but higher quality surviving children.
4.2 Malthusian regime
Such a regime is characterized by xt = 0 and nt <¥. It applies to the eve of the fertility transition
when fertility is high, people are limiting births using less-effective traditional methods but still
not investing much in the quality of their surviving children.21 From (14), it follows





¥z (vt ) . (15)
So positive quality investment (x > 0) occurs whenever vt °z(vt ), an increasing function of vt ,
is positive. This happens for vt > vˆ where the income threshold solves






In short, for vt < vˆ , child quality is absent (Malthusian regime) and when vt crosses vˆ , the
economy enters the Modern regime. From Proposition 1 it follows that for vt < v˜ , the income
threshold vˆ rises with ¡. For vt > v˜ , in contrast, vˆ falls.
Since a closed-form expression for vˆ is unavailable, vˆ cannot be directly compared with v˜
in (13) above. Suppose vt < vˆt so that we are in a Malthusian regime. Substituting &n = 0 and
&x > 0 into the first order conditions yields an equation for optimal fertility choice when the
household does not invest in child quality:










¥ ≠˘(nt ). (17)
We establish Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In a Malthusian regime – which obtains when vt < vˆ – household fertility falls
with the child survival rate (¡) but rises with full income (v). The number of surviving children
rises with the child survival rate (¡) for all income levels satisfying vt < vˆ as long as ø¡¥< 2 and
2∞µ+∏/2< (1+Ø)/(1°ø¡¥/2).
In contrast, in the Modern regime discussed above, that is when vt > vˆ , the number of sur-
viving children rises with the child survival rate but only for the sufficiently poor (vˆ < vt < v˜).
21Long (2006) documents that only half of 6-14 year olds were in school in 1851 and that the average child would
stay in school for roughly five years. School fees, ranging from 1-8 pence per week, were partly to blame for low
school attendance. Opportunity cost in terms of lost wages from child labor was also important. Long argues
that, after the 1870s, compulsory schooling laws “dramatically changed the cost benefit analysis”. While that is no
doubt true, it is our contention that the socio-economic changes we have described also had a lot of influence on
this cost-benefit analysis.
23
For the rich (vˆ < vt > v˜) , the number of surviving children falls and investment in their quality
rises.
Finally note that since our focus is on late nineteenth century England, on the eve of and




, to preclude the possi-
bility that households are at theirmaximal reproductive capacity in theMalthusian equilibrium.
4.3 Fertility transition
A story of the fertility transition is emerging from within the model. Assume households have
adopted some deliberate fertility control and contraceptive technology is what it is, the natural
kind, and does not change. Now suppose a secular decline in child mortality in underway.
Suppose v˜ < vˆ where v˜ is defined in (13) and vˆ in (16). Starting from v0 < v˜ < vˆ and n < ¥,
as v increases, n rises and so does z, with x at zero. Households respond to a secular increase
in child survival by reducing their fertility. When incomes are sufficiently low (v < vˆ), improve-
ments in child mortality raise surviving fertility across the board, even as parents do not invest
in their childrens’ quality. As v increases to above vˆ , households start substituting child quan-
tity for quality – n starts to fall and x rises. An increase in ¡ lowers both n and z.
Suppose, instead, v˜ > vˆ . Starting from v0 < vˆ , an increase in v raises n but there is no qual-
ity investment. As v increases above vˆ , quality investment turns positive. In this regime, an
increase in v lowers n and raises x. An increase in ¡ also lowers n but, again, raises z. Even-
tually as v crosses v˜ , an increase in v lowers n and raises x (as before) but now an increase in
¡ also lowers z (that is, the drop in n is strong enough). Of course, this is all conditional on
the same contraception technology. As ¡ or v becomes large enough, the cost of averting ¥°n
births is high enough that some people start switching to modern contraception. As enough
people do, there is a further sharp drop in n and increase in x.
A reduction in ∏, the effectiveness of contraception, amplifies the effect of income on fer-
tility and child quality investment. This implies, for example, that historically income had a
weak causal effect on the two and, hence, the fertility transition had to wait for the contracep-
tion revolution. In modern day developing societies where knowledge and supply of modern
contraception is more prevalent, in contrast, income becomes the binding constraint.
4.4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
Turn now to the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. We reinstate the i (household) and j
(contraception choice) subscripts and allow aggregate productivity A to grow exogenously at
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rate g . Assuming competitive factor markets, the equilibrium wage and rental rates are
wt =
°
1°µ¢Atkµt and Ωt =µAtkµ°1t (18)
where kt ¥ Kt/Ht . For full depreciation of physical capital, the interest factor is Rt = Ωt . We
define a Malthusian and a Modern equilibrium. In a Malthusian (Modern) equilibrium, every
household i finds itself in a Malthusian (Modern) regime. In addition, certain market-clearing
conditions apply. Given the initial distribution of full incomeG0(vi0) defined over [vmin,1),
Definition 1 (Malthusian equilibrium) Every household i is in aMalthusian equilibriumwhen




1 satisfies (17), x
i
t = 0, and Assumption 1 is satisfied, for
a given j . In this case, Kt =
R




" "adG(v)dG (") and (18) holds.
Definition 2 (Modern equilibrium) Every household i is in aModern equilibriumwhen vit > vˆt




1 satisfies (11), x
i
t > 0 and given by (14), and Assumption 1 is
satisfied, for a given j . In this case, Kt =
R




" "qt (v) dG(v)dG (")
and (18) holds.
Steady-state fertility is given by a time-invariant long-run distribution of household-specific
fertilities, ni1, characterized by (17) in a Malthusian equilibrium and by (11) in a Modern equi-
librium. The total fertility rate (TFR) at date t is given by the average fertility rate at that date:R






Our definition of the two equilibria precludes the possibility that some households invest in
child quality while others do not. That is, in any equilibrium, all households either have x = 0
or they all have x > 0. In our computational work later, we allow for a “mixed” equilibrium in
light of the evidence discussed in footnote 21.22
5 Fertility Control and the Diffusion of Technologies
So far we have looked at contraception equilibria under three assumptions: the child survival
rate is constant, households have access to only one kind of method and labor productivity
22Another point deserves mention here. Some demographers, for example Szreter (1996) and Garrett et al.
(2001), have argued against the idea of characterizing Victorian England as a single block and pointed to the exis-
tence of considerable heterogeneity across time, space, and social groups. Our analysis does not rule such hetero-
geneity out; in fact, we explicitly allow for heterogeneity and are among the few to do so. While the thrust of our
analysis is on the experience of England as a whole, it is quite possible that some geographical regions of England
or population groups in those regions were in one regime while others, elsewhere, were in another.
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is constant. Together these imply the economy eventually gravitates to one of two types of
stationary equilibria, high or low fertility.
The salience of these assumptions for the fertility transition will be clearer from Figure 3.
Our specification of costly contraception implies non-homothetic preferences. In Figure 3(a),
drawn in (ct ,nt ) space after substituting in optimal decisions for quality investment and saving,
the income expansion path (IEP) is non-monotonic. The kink in the IEP occurs at a full-income
income level where parents are indifferent about whether or not to invest in child quality. Be-
low this income level, increases in income increase family size. Above, the effect of income is
negative as richer households substitute towards child quality. Figure 3(b) shows how the IEP
responds to a change in the child survival rate ¡ while Figure 3(c) illustrates the response to a
change in contraceptive effectiveness (∏). A lower value of ∏, by making it easier to implement
a given fertility plan, has an effect similar to a higher ¡ on the IEP. The budget lines have been
drawn to give an idea how tradeoffs change with income. For a lower value ∏, the kink occurs
at a lower income level (Figure 3(d)): parents start substituting away from child quantity at a
lower income level when it is easier for them to afford the cost of contraception.
For more effective contraception methods (lower ∏), a given increase in e reduces child-
births by more which, in turn, enables parents to direct resources towards child quality. For a
given contraception method, a higher survival rate (higher ¡) raises the net marginal benefit of
fertility control. The benefit from surviving children does not change but the cost of “excessive”
fertility rises since parents may end up with toomany survivors. These figures illustrate the de-
mand for children falls when household full income or child survival improve sufficiently. The
negative relationship between fertility and income or child survival becomesmore pronounced
at higher income levels and more effective methods of contraception ease the ability of house-
holds to achieve their fertility targets (Figure 3(d), dotted line corresponds to a more efficient
technology).
As per the historical evidence discussed in Section 2, the transition to a modern fertility
regime is accompanied bymarital fertility control through the active use of birth control strate-
gies. Obviously households switch to a more efficient and possibly costlier contraception strat-
egy only if perceived returns from it are high. Comparative statics results discussed above point
to two potential causes for such a transition, improvements in income and child survival. The
transitionwould be facilitated by households switching towardsmore effectivemethods of con-
traception. Moreover, our model predicts richer households will switch towards modern con-
traception first, and that they will have smaller families during and after the transition (reverse
in pre-transition Malthusian equilibrium). The remainder of this section formalizes this social
change as a switch from one (less effective) technology to another (more effective) and the dif-
fusion of that choice through the population over time.
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Initially, after child mortality falls or income rises sufficiently, richer households find it ad-
vantageous to switch to modern methods of contraception despite high social and informa-
tional costs. Even if this decision were to have no social impact, a steady decrease in child mor-
tality alone would make this switch more and more desirable for households down the socio-
economic ladder. Changes in social attitudes accentuate this process in line with the historical
evidence. Specifically, the abatement of stigma associated with “unconventional” fertility regu-
lation and the diffusion of knowledge about modern methods of contraception made it advan-
tageous for households from lower socio-economic status to practice fertility regulation sooner
than they would have.
Recall the first of the two contraception technologies, j 2 {1,2}, is identified as the traditional
one, the second as modern. Specifically we assume 0∑ ∏2 < ∏1 and the fixed costs of adoption
satisfy 0 = Æ1t < Æ2t ¥ Æt initially, before technology 2 is being used. Denote household i ’s
indirect utility for the choice of the traditional technology 1 as Ui1t ¥ V i1t and utility for the
modern technology 2 as V i2t ¥Ui2t °Æt .
While the effectiveness with which contraceptives can avert childbirth underlies the param-
eter ∏, we introduce two types of fixed costs to adopting themore effective modern technology.
The overall cost Æt comprises of an information cost ÆIt and a social cost Æ
S
t . Both are endoge-
nous and depend on network externalities. Part of the cost of switching to modern contracep-
tion in traditional societies is obviously the lack of reliable information about how to regulate
fertility and how to avail of the necessary inputs. The availability of such information as well as
supply of these inputs depend on how extensively the modern technology is used. Hence we
posit that the information cost depends on an inter-temporal network externality non-linearly,
ÆIt =Æ0(1°pt°1)Æ1 , Æ0,Æ1 > 0, where pt°1 2 [0,1] is the proportion of the prior generation who
used modern contraception. The more widely used it was, the more accessible the technology
is now. The non-linearity will prove useful later in matching the slow initial update of modern
methods during the transition.
The second element of the switching cost comes from social behavior. As we discussed
in Section 2, conscious fertility control in a traditional society is fraught with social repercus-
sions. We assume someone deviating from the traditional norm attracts social censure. The
more prevalent the use of the modern contraception technology is, the less will its adoption
be viewed as radical. Suppose once a household chooses either the traditional or the mod-
ern contraception technology, the choice is irreversible. In making that choice, households
take into account the social, medical and religious disapproval they may encounter from being
more progressive. More concretely, suppose each household randomly socializes with another
member of his cohort during his youth. The household’s social payoff from this interaction is
determined by its and its social partner’s reproductive choices. This social payoff is ≥∏ 0, when
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both households have adopted the modern technology. Similar to Munshi andMyaux (2006), ≥
denotes the intrinsic utility the household receives from themodern contraception technology.
Should the social partner be a traditionalist, on the other hand, a modern household receives
the payoff ≥°ªwhere ª> 0 is the social disapproval it attracts for straying away from “traditional
principles”. The household’s payoff in the other two cases is normalized to zero.
Household i anticipates a pt proportion of people adopt the modern technology and forms
expectations of her net utility from the two technologies. If i sticks with the traditional technol-
ogy, this utility is V i1t =Ui1t . If i switches it is V i2t =Ui2t °Æt where
Æt =ÆIt +ÆSt =Æ0(1°pt°1)Æ1 + [(1°pt )ª°≥].
Household i will switch to themodern technology at t as long as¢Uit ¥Ui2t °Ui1t ∏Æt . Appendix
B shows that ¢Uit is increasing in v
i
t . This means, given the expected pt and historical pt°1
there is a threshold income level v§t such that individuals above this threshold are better-off
switching to the modern technology. Higher the (expected) adoption rate of this technology at
t and higher the past adoption rate, lower is the threshold income level. Given the distribution






We incorporate this social dynamics into the fertility choice model of Sections 3–5 and proceed
to study their role in the fertility transition.
6 Numerical Experiments
In our theory of the Victorian demographic transition, a steep mortality transition and/or in-
come growth due to productivity improvement trigger a contraception revolution, which in
turn, ushers in the long transition towards near-replacement fertility. Our model is designed,
first and foremost, to offer qualitative insight. But there is value in seeing how well it does on
the quantitative margin. The goal is not a full-blown calibration exercise, challenging as it is to
quantify preference-based social change, but rather to paint a picture of the English transition
with broad brushstrokes to see if social change and changing cost of contraception could have
made a difference to the transition.
We start by assigning parameter values so that, on certain margins, the model economy
resembles key aspects of England before and after its fertility transition. Before the transition,
all households are assumed to use traditional methods of contraception; afterward, they all
use modern ones – recall, that includes the withdrawal method. To better understand the time
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frame, consider Table 1. Child mortality (probability of death in the first five years of life) shows
a discernible downward trend after 1870 as does the total fertility rate. Consequently, we treat
1870 as the onset of the English mortality and fertility transitions.23
Period ChildMortality TFR
1845-70 0.28 4.67 (1861)
1870-95 0.22 4.04 (1891)
1895-1920 0.15 2.42 (1916)
1920-1945 0.06 2.04
1945-70 0.03 2.40
Table 1: Child Mortality and Total Fertility
It is important to note the pre-transition economy we simulate here is not the Malthusian
equilibrium of the theoretical model. In the Malthusian equilibrium, household income and
fertility rates are positively correlated. English society in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies exhibited this positive association but, by the early nineteenth century, the rich were
having fewer children (Clark, 2005, 2007). Moreover, literacy and school enrollment rates were
steadily rising during the nineteenth century (Long, 2006). In the model, if child mortality is
not changing, the only way to obtain a post-Malthusian pre-transition society is from income
growth. This is where TFP growth becomes important. To resemble the pre-transition econ-
omy, we pick parameter values so as to match aggregate child education data in 1870 as well as
ensure, for households investing in child quality (the relatively affluent), fertility is negatively
related to household full income.
Secondly, in the data, the TFR drops below replacement during the 1930s (effect of World
War I) and rises above it soon after World War II (baby boom). Since our model is not tailored
to study these temporary shifts, we treat 1945 as the end of the transition; as such, the post-
transition TFR is set to replacement, 1.0 in model terms.
6.1 Parameter Values
Table 2 lists the parameter values. We assume the modern contraception technology is highly
efficient (∏2 = 0) – it can costlessly implement a household’s fertility target when everyone uses
23Data is for the end-point of a time interval unless noted otherwise. Fertility decline lags mortality declines by
about five years, but that is not discernible in our time interval of 25 years. Mortality data comes frommortality.org,
fertility data from Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Birth Statistics: Historical Series of Statistics from
Registrations of Births in England andWales 1837-1983, series FM1, no. 13, London, HerMajesty’s Stationery Office
(1987) and from E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield’s The population history of England 1541-1871: A Reconstruction,
London, Edward Arnold (1981).
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it – as a simple normalization. One can be more general by calibrating ∏2 to replicate post-
transition fertility or some empiricalmeasure ofmodern contraceptives. But our normalization
has the advantage ofmimicing the Beckerianmodelwhere contraception costs are implicitly set
to zero. Moreover, recall that if ∏= 0, the expected number of surviving children is independent
of ¡. This means, by design, the modern technology alone cannot generate a fertility transition
from the child mortality transition.
Preference Fertility Production
Discount rate Ø= 0.37 Natural fertility ¥= 3.585 Schooling prod. a = 0.445
Altruism factor ∞= 0.45 Time cost ø= 0.09 Schooling return æ= 0.47
Weight on child quantity µ = 0.55 Goods cost ±= 0.001 Ability #= 1.35
Survival probability ¡= 0.72 Efficiency trad. ∏1 = 1.685 Capital’s share µ= 0.23
Efficiency modern ∏2 = 0 Initial TFP A0 = 141
Social cost ª= 0.0099 TFP growth rate g = 0.0315
Social cost ≥=°0.0356
Fixed cost trad. Æ0 = 0.0241
Fixed cost modern Æ1 = 2.28
Table 2: Parameter Values
Each period of adulthood is taken to be 25 years, childhood to be 15 years. The subjective
discount rate Ø follows from the standard quarterly rate of 0.99 compounded over 25 years.
µ, the weight on child quantity has to exceed 0.5 to satisfy Assumption 1(b); it is set to 0.55.
The intensity of warm-glow altruism, ∞, is picked to match post-transition TFR. Specifically, for







where household fertility choice is decreasing in full income, vt . As ¡! 1 and vt !1 (when







which is independent of household income. Given other parameter values, ∞ is chosen so that
this TFR is at replacement. The pre-transition TFR, on the other hand, is used to pin down the
effectiveness of the traditional method, ∏1. Finally the child survival rate is calibrated based on
the child mortality rate data in Table 1: 0.28 prior to the transition, zero after the transition is
complete.
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The natural fecundity ¥ depends on biological capacity as well as social constructs such as
age at marriage and celibacy. Demographers often rely on data for the Hutterites who were
perceived to practice little fertility regulation and had 10 children on average. Woods (2000)
argues against blindly adopting this number for English natural fecundity, estimating it to be
7.17 instead. This is the value (3.585 per model agent) used in our simulations. Haveman and
Wolf (1995) report the opportunity cost of childrearing to be 15% of parental time. Scaled to the
15 years of childhood, this gives ø= 0.09. The resource cost of children, ±, is a scaling parameter
and its value is set as per Doepke (2004). The contraception cost parameters (ª,≥,Æ0,Æ1) pertain
to the transition, that is, 1870-1945. We discuss how they are calibrated later.





Normalizing mean ability to unity implies "= (#°1)/#. Since reliable data on lifetime income
inequality in nineteenth century England is not available, we cannot directly calibrate this dis-
persion parameter. In any case our goal is not to explain inequality, only to broadly capture the
cross-sectional correlation between income and fertility behavior. Hence we use #, æ (elasticity
of earnings with respect to education) and a (productivity of quality investment) to generate
plausible quality investment in children; specifically, at least 60% of children receive educa-
tion in the pre-transition economy. Lindert (2004) reports 60.9% of children of ages 5-14 were
in private and public schools in England & Wales in 1870 (Table 5.1) while, according to Long
(2006), 45% of 5 years olds and 60% of 6 year olds were in school in 1851. In practice this tar-
get schooling rate is matched mainly by adjusting the parameters # and æ with a serving as a
scaling parameter. The implied æ is modest, consistent with values used in the literature.
The value for µ comes from Clark’s (2007, Table 10.1) estimate of capital’s share in British
income during 1960-2000. For the growth rate of TFP, g , we rely on Maddison’s (2001, Table
A1-c) estimates of British GDP per capita during 1820-1950. The average annual growth rate
of per capita income during this period was 1.08% per year. In other words, income per capita
increased by a factor of 4 over 1820-1950. We calibrate g to be 3.15% per generation so that we
can match this increase in income per capita over 1820-1945. Initial productivity A0 is picked
to match the level of pre-transition GDP per capita reported in Maddison (2001).
Now turn to the contraception cost parameters that govern the fertility transition during
1870-1945. Two types of evidence are available for this, neither perfect. The first, direct evi-
dence, comes from surveys on family limitation. The eminent source is the Lewis-Faning (1949)
survey of English women which finds that 15% of womenmarried before 1910 used any form of
birth control at any time in their married life, 58% of those married during 1920-24 did, while
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55% of those married in 1940-47 did. The last number is certain to be biased downwards: the
survey was completed in 1946-47 when the 1940-47marriage cohort would not have completed
its target fertility (parity) and, hence, unlikely to have fully adopted contraception. Based on
contraception practice rates of the previous cohorts, Lewis-Fanning estimates this to be around
70%. Even that number is biased downwards since contraception was steadily becoming pop-
ular with successive cohorts.24
The second type of evidence, indirect, uses an accounting procedure to arrive at an index
of marital fertility regulation. Based on Coale and Trussel’s work from the Princeton Fertility
Project, thismethod compares observedmarital fertility rates at each age group to their “natural
rates” and estimates what the degree (index) of voluntary fertility control across all age groups
must have been. Woods (2000, Table 4.2) calculates an England-specific natural fertility sched-
ule and estimates England’s index of family limitation to have gone from 0.013 (1871) to 0.171
(1891) to 0.842 (1922) to 1.036 (1933). In the model, there is a close link between the fertility ra-
tio nit/¥, number of births to married women relative to the total births to those women if they
were subject to maximum fertility – same as the variable Ig in the Coale-Trussel method – and
contraception strategy (∏): a reduction in the latter through the use of modern contraception
reduces the former. That is, the proportion of households regulating fertility using the modern
method in the model directly translates into an aggregate-level index of family limitation.
The Coale-Trussel evidence, as extended byWoods (2000), does not face the response prob-
lems of the Lewis-Fanning survey. It does, however, have one drawback for us: no distinction is
made between households who were starting to adopt methods such as coitus interruptus and
those that were moving on to appliance-based methods. To the extent that adoption of coitus
interruptus is associated with a better understanding of the process of procreation, its very us-
age, arguably, made it modern. More importantly, appliances were rare in the late nineteenth
century: some, such as condoms and spermicides, had just started being mass produced but
were not widely available for ordinary people, others like diaphragms were popularized later –
the Lewis-Faning (1949) survey found 31% of married women had ever used a non-appliance
method by 1940-47.With these caveats in mind, we proceed to use Woods’ estimates to impute
that the proportion of households practicing modern contraception went from 0% (1871) to
17.1% (1891) to 84.3% (1922) to 100% by 1933. Since the English fertility transition starts around
1870, these imply modern contraception – again, this includes the withdrawal method – usage
of 17.1% in the first period of transition (by 1895), 84.3% in the second period (by 1920) and
24There are other problems. Besides the small sample size – 3281 respondents from different marriage cohorts –
reporting bias is to be expected: women would have been reticent to talk about such matters to surveyors or they
might not have known much since birth control was largely a male decision before the advent of the pill. Lewis-
Faning also reports contraception rates were correlated with socio-economic status: more women from wealthier
occupations were relying on it.
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100% in the third period (by 1945).25
To replicate the mortality and fertility transitions in Table 1, we “shock” the model by the
mortality transition period T (1870-95) onwards and trace the model’s prediction about the
TFR period T onwards. For this fertility transition we need to calibrate the information cost
(Æ0,Æ1) and social cost parameters (≥,ª). We choose these four parameters to best fit four pieces
of evidence: the switch towards modern contraception does not start until period T and the
adoption rates are 17%, 84.3% and 100% in periods T , T +1 and T +2. Since each generation
gets a fresh draw from the ability distribution, we choose these parameter values so that mean
adoption rates (across 20 rounds of simulation) match their empirical counterparts.
6.2 Simulation Results
Start with the upper panel of Figure 4 that reports the proportion of households adopting the
modern contraceptionmethod over time. The solid line corresponds to themodel’s prediction,
the dotted to actual data. The two are very closely aligned, not surprising, given the calibration
strategy. The grey band in this and subsequent figures represents a “95% confidence interval”,
computed as the sample mean ± 1.96 £ the sample standard deviation across 20 rounds of
simulation. It is shown only to illustrate the model is not overtly sensitive to the exact ability





, during the transition. It remains steady and suggests, given the calibration
strategy, social costs were slightly more important in accounting for the shift towards modern
methods of contraception.
Fertility Transition
How well does the model’s predicted fertility transition match the evidence? This is reported
in Figure 5 for the transition period of T + 1 to T + 3 (1870° 1945): the solid black line is the
predicted path of the TFR, the dashed red line is the data. The predicted path is quite close to
the data though the fit is less than perfect in the third period of the transition when predicted
TFR is 25% higher than replacement and 29% higher than actual.
Recall, however, that the calibration matched replacement TFR when everyone switches
to modern contraception and household income goes to infinity. So a better assessment of
the model’s predictive power is to compare the simulated TFR during the first two periods of
the transition when the calibration targets only contraception adoption rate, not the fertility
rates. By this yardstick, the model does quite well: predicted TFR is 6% above actual by the
25A prior version of this paper used the Lewis-Fanning estimates, assuming the actual practice of contraception
by 1945 was close to 100%. Key results were similar to what we present here, including the relative importance of
child mortality over income growth in explaining the fertility transition.
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end of T +1 and 33% above actual by the end of T +2. This becomes clearer when we consider
counterfactuals below.
Two other points about Figure 5 should be noted. First, the transition to replacement does
not complete until another two generations in the model. We set the post-1945 TFR in England
and Wales, somewhat artificially, to replacement; in reality, replacement was not reached until
1970 (that is, corresponding to period T +5 in the model). Moreover, the post-transition model
was calibrated under the assumption household full income v!1. As such, that the simulated
transition takes longer to converge to replacement than in the data is not a serious shortcoming.
While the model does well in capturing how the fertility transition unfolded, it is not tailored to
explain why English fertility fell below replacement after WWI and then overshot replacement
in the decades following WWII (Figure 1).
Note also, by design, the model is calibrated to reproduce the observed TFR in period T .
In the data, TFR was steadily falling since the early nineteenth century. While the model does
predict a steady decline – solely due to income growth – it does not predict as big of a decline
as we see in the data. Demographers believe the early nineteenth century decline was driven
mainly by the extensive margin which is missing from our model. In addition, the pre- and
post-1841 TFR data come from two different sources – see Figure 1 – and the year for which
they overlap (1841) shows a large discrepancy between the two sources. Both data sets point
towards some decline in the early nineteenth century. The more pronounced decline, though,
occurs after 1870.
Hence, on the basis of Figure 4, we conclude that incorporating the costs of birth control
during the transition substantially improves the Beckerian model’s explanatory power and the
ability of the mortality transition, in particular, to generate a TFR transition.
The role of income growth and contraception
Income too has an effect on fertility in the model: as England became steadily prosperous over
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this would have lowered the TFR inde-
pendently of themortality transition.26 How relevant was thismargin for the English transition?
Did the contraception revolution play a pivotal role?
Consider two counterfactual scenarios. To isolate the relevance of income growth, wemain-
tain ¡ at its 1870 value of 0.72 and simulate the time path of the TFR, allowing contraception
adoption to change from the Coale-Trussel-Woods estimates. A second counterfactual asks
whether the switch to more efficient methods of contraception and their falling costs account
26This prediction about income growth is at variance with conventional thinking among demographers, but
related to Galor’s work where technological progress improves the valuation of education, causing households to
shift from child quantity to quality.
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for much of the transition. For this we set Æ0 sufficiently high so that no household switches to
the modern method during the periods T +1 to T +3. These scenarios are presented in Figure
6. Since we do not recalibrate the model in either scenario to match the observed adoption of
modern contraception, for comparability we present amodified version of the benchmark case
wheremortality alone changes exogenouslywhile TFP growth is held to zero from1870 onwards
(that is, whatever income growth occurs comes from the endogenous accumulation of human
and physical capital).
The solid orange line in Figure 6 (solid black and dashed red lines represent the same series
as in Figure 5) presents this modified benchmark case – evidently the lack of TFP growth does
not drastically alter the model’s predictive power. The blue dotted line represents the path of
the TFR when child mortality does not change, while the green dash-dotted line corresponds
to the no-switch scenario. In these two alternative scenarios, even five generations after the
fertility transition started, the TFR remains higher than 3. By the third period of the transition,
the predicted TFR is more than twice the replacement level and 70% higher than the baseline
prediction. By period T +1, predicted TFR is 14% above actual, by T +2 it is 88% above actual.
In other words, while income growth has a significant impact on fertility behavior, its impact
on the English fertility transition seems less so if the only channel is exogenous productivity
growth.
It is not surprising when switching costs are too high (dash-dotted line), the TFR decline is
also relatively small compared to what we observe during the historical transition. Here, how-
ever, the model predicts a faster TFR transition relative to the income-only scenario, indicat-
ing again the relative importance of the child mortality transition. Fertility remains 74% (38%)
higher than replacement (baseline prediction) by T +3 in this case. By period T +1, predicted
TFR is 10% above actual, by T +2 it is 71% above actual.
Net fertility
Finally turn to Figure 7 which shows predicted and actual net fertility during 1841-1945. A cen-
tral prediction of our model is that a decline in child mortality also lowers the NFR. The dashed
line at the bottom represents the data, the NRR2 series reported in Figure 1. The solid black line
represents the predicted path of NFR from themodel, computed as ¡n assuming boys and girls
faced the same survival rate which is consistent with the evidence (Hinde, 2003, Table 12.1).
Since the model ignores mortality for women during their reproductive years, we overestimate
net fertility. But the general trendpredicted for 1845°1945 closely follows the data. This is not so
for the two counterfactual scenarios. For the constant mortality scenario (blue dotted line), we
have seen from Figure 6 that productivity-based income growth alone does not lower the TFR
by much and we see here the predicted NFR barely moves. For the scenario where households
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do not switch to modern contraception (green dash-dotted line), the predicted NFR behaves
similarly and even shows a slight increase: evidently mortality change and income growth to-
gether without the accompanying social change are not enough to substantially lower the TFR
to compensate for the higher child survival rate.
We recognize there is uncertainty and debate regarding social change and contraception
behavior in late-eighteenth and early nineteenth century England. With that in mind, we view
these simulation results as strongly suggestive: contraception costs and the social change that
accompanied the shift towards fertility regulation were likely to have been important elements
of the English fertility transition. Contraception alone could not have triggered the transition.
In our broad brushstrokes view, it was the catalyst, and a powerful one at that, in the change
unleashed by underlying changes to mortality and income.
It is also worth reiterating that these simulation results should not be taken as efforts to
refute alternative theories, for example, the effect of income through the gender wage gap and
occupational choice (Galor andWeil, 1996,Mookherjee et al., 2012) or the effect of childmortal-
ity under survival uncertainty (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2008). Neither is the success of the mortality or
contraception channels in the English context indicative of their relative importance in other
transitions. It does show, however, that in many cases ignoring large and changing costs of
contraception can lead us to under-appreciate the proximate causes of the fertility transition.
More pointedly, since mortality affects net fertility only in the presence of contraception in the
model, one may erroneously discount the importance of the mortality transition if one ignores
the associated contraception calculus.
7 Implications for Recent Transitions
Demographic transitions are underway even to this day with almost every nation witnessing
deep declines in child mortality and marital fertility. World population growth has declined
rapidly since the 1960s; the world TFR has fallen from 5.0 births per woman during her lifetime
in the early 1950s to 2.5 births in 2010, a remarkable decline of 50%. Women in developing
countries – sub-Saharan Africa is an exception – transitioned from having around six births
during their lifetime to having closer to two births. Does our work have anything to say about
these modern transitions?
In a recent study using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 65 countries in differ-
ent years between 1988 and 2005, Canning et al (2013) find the following. In high-fertility coun-
tries, those in the early stages of the transition, desired fertility may exceed actual fertility, so
that broader socioeconomic changes that affect desired fertility have little impact on observed
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fertility.27 Interestingly, they also find that effects of social learning about the fertility calculus of
others, and social spillovers more generally, is strongest in the early stages. To the extent early
stages ofmodern transitions look like their counterparts in historical transitions, the Canning et
al (2013) study lends credence to the timelessness of the main mechanisms underlying fertility
change in our model.
And what of the importance of the contraception revolution in modern transitions? Surely,
access to and information regarding effective means of birth control are not stumbling blocks
in the lives of modern couples? Researchers have documented the widespread, secular in-
crease in the use of contraception, due in part to vastly improved access to contraceptives.
Economic demographers, however, remain skeptical of their relevance formodern fertility tran-
sitions notwithstanding Richard Easterlin’s earlier work. Their skepticism has been reinforced
by Pritchett’s (1994) influential study that 90% of cross-country differences in the level of the
TFR is explained by differences in women’s reported desired fertility alone. In other words, the
means to achieve that desired fertility, contraception for instance, plays a minor role. This con-
clusion has been recently questioned by Lam (2011) in his presidential address to the annual
meeting of the Population Association of America. Lam uses data from 185 DHS surveys for 74
countries, a considerably larger set of surveys than Pritchett used. He looks at changes in de-
sired and actual TFR. While desired fertility fell by an average of 0.038 births per year, the TFR
fell by 0.060 births: 47% of the average decline in the TFR came from better ways to achieve
fertility targets. Our theory can rationalize these seemingly contradictory findings. Conditional
on a contraception method, all changes in the TFR come from changes in desired fertility (due
to income growth and better child survival). Over time, changes in the availability and adoption
of alternative, more efficient, methods account for an increasingly significant part of TFR de-
clines. The onset of the fertility decline, though, stems from factors other than the availability
of contraceptives.
A closer look at country-specific evidence uncovers interesting differences. The arrival of fe-
male family planning programs caused an outcry in Bangladeshwhile in India andKenya the re-
sistance was more internal – fear of side effects, social acceptance and disapproving husbands.
Not only was there little public outcry in Thailand and Taiwan, in contrast, women were enthu-
siastic adopters of modern contraceptives, in some cases traveling far to avail of them (Cleland,
2001). Why contraception is so controversial in some countries but not in others is itself a fas-
cinating question. Studies connecting family planning to completed fertility, likewise, provide
mixed evidence. Miller’s (2009) study of Columbia’s well-established family planning program
27Desired fertility counts only births of women who say they want another birth, with an adjustment for incom-
plete childbearing. It is not based on ex post statements about children being wanted. Note also that in ourmodel,
as in the standard Becker model, all fertility is desired.
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concludes that it’s contribution to fertility declinewasminor though it did encourage education
and labor force participation among young women. Cochrane and Guilkey (1995), on the other
hand, show that access to family planning methods was a significant cause of Tunisia’s fertility
decline. Ethiopia’s family planning programs have been credited with reducing completed fer-
tility by one child among uneducated women (Pörtner et al., 2011) while Bailey’s (2012) work
shows that, even in the post-transition US, the expansion of family planning programs may
have lowered childbearing among poor women by as much as 29%.
An advantage of our modified Becker model is that it provides a common analytical frame-
work to understand fertility change across societies. Whether or not and howmuch contracep-
tion accounts for fertility change may be entirely country-specific. And the proximate determi-
nants of that change may also differ from region to region. It bears repeating, however, that in
our theory contraception by itself cannot domuch – factors that lower the demand for children
are what initiate the change that then, potentially, benefits from the knowledge and availability
of contraception.
8 Conclusion
In much of Europe, dramatic declines in both mortality and fertility started in the late nine-
teenth century, a phenomenon that came to be known as the demographic transition. In most
instances, mortality decline preceded fertility decline. We argue, the former incentivized the
latter. In our theoretical model, as child mortality declines, the unfettered procreation process
produces “too many” surviving children. At that point, families start to adopt modern contra-
ception as a way to economize on costly children and free up resources for their upkeep and
quality. Richer households are the first to regulate marital fertility and, in doing so, kindle a
process of indirect diffusion that gradually lowers fertility across socio-economic groups. In
our story, mortality decline is the principal instigator that necessitates a culture of conscious
contraception which, in turn, becomes the facilitator of fertility reductions.
But that is only part of the story. The latter part of the nineteenth century is also a period
of rapid social, economic and cultural change brought on, in part, by impressive increases in
living standards and improvements in nutrition and health. Surely, these too shaped fertility
demand and acted as important catalysts of reproductive change. Our theory is not unreceptive
to these alternative explanations; it allows for the possibility that rapid income growth, even in
the absence of precipitous mortality declines or massive uptake of modern contraception may
bring about a fertility transition.
Since our aim has been to single out social influence for fertility choice and its scope in the
historical English transition, this work should not be taken as establishing the salience of mor-
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tality over income for that transition. Whether or not mortality was the determinant of English
fertility change remains an open, quantitative, issue. To answer that one needs to create more
space for income growth to matter; Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010), for example, offer one av-
enue that relies on relatively substitutable child quality and quantity in household preferences.
We leave it to future work such a thorough exploration and more directed applications of our
theory to twentieth and twenty-first century transitions.
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Appendix
A Second Order Condition
Since the budget constraint can become non-convex with quality and quantity, we check sec-
ond order conditions. To that end, use the optimality conditions for s and x to express utility as
a function of n alone (ignoring non-relevant terms):
V (nt )ª= [1+Ø+∞(1°µ)] ln
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For a given fertility choice, n, suppose optimal consumption and child quality decisions are
c1(n), c2(n) and x(n). Doing so and substituting these into the utility function allows us to ex-
press the household’s objective function in terms of n alone. Obviously, given a j technology,
@U/@n = 0 at the optimum. We have already established that @n/@v < 0 whenever child qual-
ity investment is positive, which is the case we consider in Section 7. Now we need to show
@¢U/@v > 0. Since 0∑ ∏2 < ∏1, it is sufficient to prove as ∏ rises,U (v) becomes flatter. That is,
we need to show @2U/@∏@v = @2U/@v@∏< 0 sinceU is continuous in ∏ and v .
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